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INTRODUCTION

Factively
OR ALMOST THIRTY years, the city of San Francisco has
striven to

protect its gay population from any form of
discrimination in the commercial or marketplace settings. A
shining example of this support was the passing of a 1972 local
code blocking city businesses from contracting with companies
that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.I Subsequent
amendments to the code by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors focused on benefits packages. The final amended ordinance ("Ordinance") bars any company that discriminates in
the provision of benefits "between employees with domestic
partners and employees with spouses and/or between the domestic partners and spouses of such employees, where the domestic partnership has been registered with a governmental
See S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 12B (1997).
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entity pursuant
to state or local law authorizing such
2
registration."
The Ordinance's nondiscrimination requirements apply to
"any of a contractor's operations within San Francisco" as well as
"any of a contractor's operations elsewhere in the United
States."' Although San Francisco International Airport ("SFO")
lies outside the city's boundaries, the Ordinance's reach extended to SFO's ability to enter into commercial relationships,
including placing conditions on who may enter into SFO-related
contracts with San Francisco.4
In 1998, the Ordinance was challenged by the principal trade
organization for airlines in the United States, the Air Transport
Association ("ATA"). 5 As of mid-1997, fifteen ATA members
flew into SFO, including Federal Express and United Airlines,
neither of which provided domestic-partner benefits to employees nationwide. 6 Included among the ATA's four arguments
against the Ordinance was a constitutional challenge based on
the idea that it "is invalid under the United States Constitution
as an attempt by the City to regulate conduct performed beyond
its borders. ' 7 The ATA contended that the Ordinance violated
the Commerce Clause 8 insofar as it placed an undue burden on
interstate commerce.'
In the ATA's suit against the city, it argued that, as a federally
regulated industry, the airlines were exempt from the Ordinance's mandate forcing them to extend domestic-partner benefits throughout the country."' The ATA contended that it was
unconstitutional for the city to force its will on the entire airline
industry.1" The ATA couldn't fathom the audacity of a city ordinance geared toward punishing airlines for something that had
no direct connection to San Francisco.
The ATA saw this as a classic case of overzealous local legislation. "This is not an issue over sexual orientation," said Sue
Id. § 12B.l(b).
3 Id. § 12B.1(d).
, See Air Cal. Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 865 F.2d 1112, 1117 (9th
Cir. 1989).
5 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp.
1149, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
G Id.
7 Jd. at 1160.
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also discussion infra Part III.
9 See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 992 F. Supp. at 1156.
2

Id.
'1 Id.
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Thurman, a United spokesperson.' 2 "It's about whether or not
a local government can dictate the employee policies of a company engaged in interstate commerce." 13 The Ordinance, however, was of a far more personal nature for San Francisco. Said
City supervisor Leslie Katz: "[T]hey could do it because it's the
right, decent and fair thing to do."' 4
In a confusing double-edged decision, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California ruled in favor of the ATA,
finding that the Ordinance violated the Commerce Clause to
the extent that it impermissibly regulates extraterritorial commerce. 5 The true meaning of the ruling was unclear because,
while it allowed the Ordinance to be applied to businesses
within the city, the court prevented the Ordinance's reach from
extending to out-of-state businesses that contract with San
Francisco."'
The hazy decision left both sides claiming victory. Lawyers for
the airlines viewed the decision as a showing that no single city
can set rules for the airline industry. "The court has said you
can't apply this lawfully to a nationwide industry," said Brendan
Dolan, an airlines attorney. 17 Said San Francisco City Attorney
Louise Renne, "This is the first major decision upholding a domestic partners ordinance.""
But upon closer inspection, this ruling cannot accurately be
described as anything more than a hollow victory for proponents of the Ordinance. While it acknowledged that a public
locale may be able to take a stance against companies that discriminate, it placed an insurmountable obstacle in the path of a
complete victory over discrimination. That obstacle is the Commerce Clause."i0
The court explained that the Commerce Clause forbade the
Ordinance from imposing burdens on interstate commerce. z
The burden here was that once a company signed a San Fran12 Gregory Lewis, United Sues Over Partners Law, S. F.
at A-1.

EXAMINER,

Aug. 29, 1998,

13 Id.
14 Id.

Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 992 F. Supp. at 1159.
i See id. at 1165.
17 See Maria LaGanga & Stephanie Simon, Court Upholds S.F 's
Domestic Partner
Benefits Ordinance, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1998, at Al.
1
Edward Epstein, Judges Ruling Affirms Domestic PartnerLaw in S.F. But Rules on
Compliance Cut, S. F. CHRON., Apr. 11, 1998, at All.
19 See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 992 F. Supp. at 1161.
20 Id. at 1165.
15
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cisco contract, it would then be barred from providing unequal
discriminatory benefit packages to its workers throughout the
country without facing city-imposed penalties. 21 "The Ordinance burdens interstate commerce because out-of-state companies that provide discriminatory benefits packages are barred
from obtaining certain City contracts. ' 22 This ruling was contrary to the Supreme Court's long history of applying the Commerce Clause as a remedy for discriminatory and morally
questionable activities that impact interstate commerce. 23 The
federal district court in California disregarded the Ordinance's
anti-discriminatory purpose in favor of ensuring a free flow of
interstate commerce.24
The court acknowledged that the Ordinance sought to combat a societal evil, stating that "San Francisco has a long history
of taking a principled stand against discrimination and of being
in the forefront of efforts to ban discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 25 Yet, despite this recognition of the Ordinance's
purpose, the city's anti-discriminatory goals were not enough to
overcome a Commerce Clause argument. Said the court: "[T] he
Ordinance is impermissibly extraterritorial to the extent the Ordinance is applied to out-of-State conduct that is not related to
the purposes of the City contract. "26
Thus, the court set a pecking order for Commerce Clause application, with top priority going to the best interests of unhindered interstate commerce. All other concerns, whether of a
morally questionable or discriminatory nature, were secondary
at best. Airlines could continue using SFO, which was subject to
city ordinances, even if those airlines had benefits policies that
stood for everything that San Francisco had fervently opposed
for over three decades.27
This comment will explore the rationale behind this ruling by
the Northern District of California and explain why it was a dangerous application of the Commerce Clause. Included is a
showing of how the ruling contradicts most Supreme Court rulId. at 1163.
Id. at 1164.
23 See discussion infra Parts III.A, C, IV.
24 See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 992 F. Supp. at 1161-62.
25 Id. at 1164. See also Alioto's Fish Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n of San Francisco, 120 Cal. App. 3d 594, 605 (Cal Ct. App. 1972) (ruling that the city can
prohibit a contractor from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation).
26 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 992 F. Supp. at 1165.
27 See id.
21
22
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ings dealing with similar types of issues. Also included is an
overview of Commerce Clause application to various types of relevant issues that were predominant in this San Francisco case.
The court's application is lethal in that it kills any hope the city
has of fully purging itself of companies that discriminate against
gays. When analyzed in the manner adopted by the Northern
District Court of California, the Commerce Clause will always
stand in the way of local efforts to erase evils such as sex-based
discrimination.
II. DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS AND THE COURTS
A. HARD ROAD FOR DOMESTIC PARTNERS SEEKING BENEFITS
Historically, the courts have not been kind to proponents of
work benefits for same-sex partners. 28 The majority of litigation
regarding the denial of spousal benefits to employees in samesex relationships has failed.t ' Most of these failed attempts were
challenges to the benefits policies of state or local government
employers under state employment discrimination statutes or
constitutional provisions.'
One Achilles heel for seekers of same-sex benefits has been
that the federal government has been reluctant to impose a
mandate on private employers to provide domestic partner benefits.3 ' Another problem is that same-sex marriage participants
do not meet the definition of "spouse" provided by state marriage laws. "2 This is because no state currently recognizes same
sex marriages as a legal marriage.3 3 Therefore, since employment benefits traditionally have flowed to couples by virtue of
their recognized marriage, same-sex partners have been unable
to gain benefits because they are not per se legally married.
B. MARKETPLACE COMPETITION CLEARS PATH
Despite the inability to gain support from the federal government and the elusiveness of legal marital status, the tide has
28 See Paul Lynd, Domestic PartnerBenefits Limited to Same-Sex Couples: Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 6 Wm.& MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 561 (2000).
29 Id.

30 See, e.g., Hinman v. Dep't of Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985). (rejecting claims of sexual-orientation and marital-status discrimination); Ross v. Denver Dep't of Health and Hosps., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994) (same).
"I See Lynd, supra note 28.
32 Id.

33See id.
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shifted in favor of those seeking domestic partner benefits. Because of the competition for employees in the labor marketplace, employers 4have been motivated to extend same-sex
benefits packages.1

"Employers recognize that more comprehensive compensation packages, including domestic partner benefits, are essential
to attracting or retaining current employees."35 Such benefits
have become a key hiring or retention tool, especially in the
fields of high technology, entertainment and media industries,
financial and insurance firms, academia and law firms.36 "Competition for employees in some of these segments of the labor
market ...

has been intense in some circumstances. The exis-

tence or absence of domestic partner benefits can be, respectively, an incentive or deterrent to an individual accepting or
continuing employment with an employer."" Employers offering benefits to domestic partners include American Express,
Barnes & Noble, Chevron, Microsoft, and Walt Disney.3 Many
local governments have also adopted domestic-partner benefits
for employees, including Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Seattle, Washington, and Travis County, Texas. 9 As of 1998,
ATA members Federal Express and United Airlines had yet to
join the trend.4 °
III.
A.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

BEGINNINGS OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

In the landmark 1824 case Gibbons v. Ogden,4 Chief Justice
John Marshall set guidelines for Congress's power to control
commerce amongst the states. It was the first significant description of the Commerce Clause, the constitutional vehicle by
which Congress can regulate commerce between the states.42
Included in the Commerce Clause is an implied limitation on
34See id. at 568.
35 Id.

36 See Lynd, supra note

28, at 568.

37 Id.

38 Todd Foreman, Nondiscrimination Ordinance 101 San Francisco'sNondiscrimination in City Contracts and Benefits Ordinance: A New Approach to Winning Partner
ship Benefits, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 319, 334 (1999).
3q See id. at 344.
40 See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp.
1149, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
41 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
42 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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the power of state and local governments to enact laws impacting interstate commerce."
The setting was a dispute between a shipping company that
monopolized the waters surrounding New York and New Jersey
and a competing independent contractor.44 In ruling that navigation on the internal waters of a state, much less the waters
between two states, was a subject for regulation by Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court allowed
45
Congress a broad power to regulate commerce between states.
In the context of this issue, Marshall declared that the term
commerce meant "intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules
for carrying on that intercourse.

' 46

Marshall stretched Con-

gress's reach to the fullest: "No sort of trade can be carried on
...

to which this power does not extend."47

To prevent federal regulation from running rampant, Marshall gave the reigns of congressional power a slight tug by establishing boundaries. "It may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more States than one ....

[I] ts ac-

tion is to be applied to all the internal concerns which affect the
States generally; but not to those which are completely within a
particular State, which do not affect other States .

"48

Thus,

the question of whether Congress may take action under the
Commerce Clause hinges on "whether the activity sought to be
regulated is 'commerce which concerns more States that one'
and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest."49
Over the next 70 years, the Supreme Court consistently found
that numerous types of commerce fit this distinction of "'commerce which concerns more states than one' and has a real and
substantial relation to the national interest."5 " Everything from
meat packing (which the Court ruled was an intrastate activity
that was part of a stream of commerce that crosses state lines)5"
43 See id. See also New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988);
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
44 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1.
45 See id.
46 Id. at 190.
47 Id. at 193-94.
48 Id. at 194-95.
49 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964).
,5Id.
51 In United States v. Swift, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), the Court tracked the stream of
commerce as cattle delivery from Texas to Chicago for slaughter, and then it
looked to the meat being shipped nationwide.
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to the distribution of lottery tickets (which the Court determined as having affects in interstate commerce) 52 were within
Congress's grasp.
B.

LIMITATION OF COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER

The Court took a sudden about-face in 1905 with its controversial ruling in Lochner v. New York, a decision that set the tone
for the Court's disallowance of legislative interference with ordinary trades. 53 The Court ruled as unconstitutional a New York
law that prohibited employers from contracting with workers to
provide over sixty hours of labor per week. The Court contended that the government could not infringe on the right to
contract. "Labor law pure and simple" is a flat-out illegitimate
state end. 54 The message was clear: If the legislature can control
the labor market, it will control other markets as well. The emphasis on the right to freedom to contract led to the Court finding many laws unconstitutional over the early part of the 20th
Century.

The momentum of Lochner steamrolled even the best-intentioned government attempts at commerce regulation. During
the Depression years of the 1930s, President Franklin Deleanor
Roosevelt wanted to utilize federal government regulation to

rescue the drowning economy. But the court invalidated several
New Deal programs on the ground that Congress exceeded its
power under the Commerce Clause.
Subscribing to a markedly different approach to the food
market than previously taken in United States v. Swift, the Court

in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States invalidated a congressional act designed to control labor rules for the New York
poultry industry. 56 The code, which applied to "transaction [s]
in or affecting interstate commerce," was determined to be an
excessive application of the Commerce Clause. In Carterv. Carter
Coal Co., federal laws geared toward easing labor tensions within
the coal industry were invalidated by the Court because the dysfunction that the government was seeking to correct was only
indirectly related to national economic harmony.5 7
52

See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).

53 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
54 Id. at 57.
55 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); see

also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
56 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 549.
57 Carter, 298 U.S. at 303.
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RAPID EXPANSION OF COMMERCE CLAUSE APPLICATION

It wasn't until 1937 that the Court loosened the leash on federal control. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court
upheld the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
to regulate labor relations in the steel industry. 8 The Court
turned a deaf ear to the commonly used arguments of "flow of
commerce" or "direct-indirect impact. 5 9 It instead adopted a
realistic economic approach by recognizing that a labor stoppage of the Pennsylvania intrastate manufacturing operations
would have a substantial effect on commerce."' Regarding their
dismissal of previously accepted arguments, the Court warned
that "the scope of [the commerce] power . . . may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so
indirect and remote that to embrace them ... would effectually
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government."'" More
recently, the Court stated that "in the years since [Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.] . . . Congress has had considerably greater
latitude in regulating conduct and transactions under the Com62
"....
merce Clause
The court remained completely deferential to congressional
exercise of commerce power until 1995, when it ruled in United
States v. Lopez that laws making it a federal crime to knowingly
possess a firearm in a school zone exceeded Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause.13 Crucial to the Lopez holdingand to the discussion herein-is the Court's identification of
three broad categories of activity that may be regulated by Congress through its commerce power. These categories remain
the standard by which all Commerce Clause issues are
determined.6 4
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate
51 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
59 Carter, 298 U.S. at 238.
60 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 59.

61 Id. at 37. See also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S 324, 336 (1989) (ruling that
the Commerce Clause precludes state and local laws that have the extraterritorial
effect of regulating "commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a
State").
62 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000).
64 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
64 In Morrison, the most recent Supreme Court case to deal with the Commerce
Clause, the Court followed these Lopez guidelines in ruling against Congress' reliance on the Commerce Clause.
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and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities. "Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce
965

If the trend had continued to favor governmental deference
in Commerce Clause matters, the Ordinance in San Francisco
would have easily survived scrutiny. But the new trend against
government control would influence future courts' application
of the Lopez standards, and ultimately have a damaging impact
on the fate of the San Francisco Ordinance.""
IV.
A.

COMMERCE CLAUSE APPLIED TO MORAL ISSUES
COMMERCE CLAUSE USED TO STIFLE MORAL WRONGS

Moral issues, such as the one regarding gay benefits in Air
TransportationAssociation of America v. City & County of San Francisco,6 7 are no strangers to the Commerce Clause. The Supreme
Court has never hesitated to uphold state or city legislation
prohibiting moral wrongs. The Court has ruled that federal legislation intended to curtail the disruptive effect of such evils as
racial discrimination68 and deceptive sales practices69 on interstate commerce constitutes proper application of the Commerce Clause.
This concern for protecting interstate commerce from the illeffects of moral wrongs has prompted Congress to extend the
exercise of its power to gambling, T1 criminal enterprises, 71 fraudulent security transactions,7 9 misbranding of drugs,73 and discrimination against shippers.74 From this it would seem that a
compelling moral argument could be made for extending the
Commerce Clause to the San Francisco Ordinance, which was
65 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.

See S.F. ADMIN. CODE §9.B (1997).
Air Transp. Assoc. of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco,992 F. Supp. 1149,
1156-57 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
68 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S 241 (1964).
69 See FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959).
70 See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
71 See Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
72 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
73 See Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618 (1918).
74 See United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 333 U.S. 169 (1948).
66
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implemented to defeat what the city believed was a moral wrong
against same-sex couples.
B.

Morrison Limits Commerce Clause Reach Into
Moral Wrongs

Despite such rulings that seem to take a moral high ground,
the federal government's application of the Commerce Clause is
often limited when it comes to moral issues. The Court's 2000
ruling in United States v. Morrison,75 which left violence against
women out of the Commerce Clause's reach, makes all the more
difficult a Commerce Clause claim for gay benefits. How could
one argue that a company's refusal to grant benefits to same-sex
couples fits within the Commerce Clause when the Supreme
Court has just ruled that the most immoral of all activities, rape,
does not fall under the Clause's umbrella?
In Morrison, the Supreme Court resisted a moralistic argument, made on behalf of a rape victim in Virginia, that such
violence against women met the third Lopez prong of "'activity
substantially affect[ing] interstate commerce.' ,,76 Central to the
Morrison ruling was a statement by Chief Justice Souter in his
dissenting opinion in Lopez: "[A] ny conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the commerce power may
reach so far. '77 The Court interpreted this to mean that Commerce Clause regulation should extend strictly to those activities
that have an obvious relation to interstate commerce, those that
are "economic" in nature.7 8
Apparently, violence against women did not meet this requirement. In Morrison, the petitioner alleged that three male students raped her and that this attack violated the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), 9 which provides a federal civil
remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Specifically, petitioners argued that the Commerce Clause provided
Congress with the authority to enact the civil remedy provision
of the VAWA because rape substantially impacts interstate
commerce. 8
75 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
76 See id. at 610 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559).
77 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580.
78 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
79 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2001).

81 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604.
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Relying on numerous congressional findings on violence
against women, petitioner claimed that these activities had an
adverse impact on interstate commerce. Regarding rape, the evidence focused on such findings as "close to half a million girls
now attending high school will be raped before they graduate; 8 1 and "almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or
are forced to quit because of the crime's severity. '82 Congress
found that crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in
employment in interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved in interstate commerce; . .. by

diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other
costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products."'
The Court first rejected this argument by drawing a parallel
between rape and the handguns in schools issue of Lopez. The
Court found rape to be similar to gun-toting teens because both
were of "noneconomic, criminal nature. '"84 According to the

Court, the link between these activities and interstate commerce
was "attenuated. '"85 Said the Court: "Gender-motivated crimes
of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity." 6 The Court also ruled that Congress intended the VAWA
to pertain to activity of a broader more intrastate nature. Regarding the massive congressional findings on violence against
women and its alleged affect on interstate commerce, the Court
ruled that "the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation."87
To support this ruling, the Court fell back on Lopez: "[S] imply
because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make
81 S. REP. No. 101-545, at 31 (1990) (citing ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT
RAPE 117 (1988)).
82 S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991) (citing E. Ellis, et. Al., An Assessment of a

Long-Term Reaction to Rape, 90J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 264 (1981)).
83 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385
(1994)).
84 Id. at 610.
85 Id. at 612.
86 Id. at 613.
87 Id. at 614.
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it so." '8 Clearly, the Court was ordering the federal government
to butt out of "[t]he regulation and punishment of intrastate
violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels,
or goods involved in interstate commerce," which has always
t
been the duty of the states to control."
The Morrison ruling disarmed a federal weapon aimed at curtailing rape and punishing those committing violent crimes
against women. Other such well-intentioned efforts, like San
Francisco's attempt to discourage discrimination against gays,
would also be defused by Commerce Clause limitations."'
V.

COMMERCE CLAUSE AND TRANSPORTATION LAW
A.

CLAUSE PROTECTS TRANSPORTATION OF PEOPLE

Historically, the federal government's Commerce Clause powers were commonly extended to transportation-related activities,
especially when discriminatory practices were involved. Basically, anything that interfered with the transport of people,
whether it is the mode of transportation itself or the housing of
that mode, was within grasp of the Clause.
The movement of passengers was long ago placed within the
reach of the Commerce Clause. In 1913, Justice McKenna,
speaking for the Court in Hoke v. United States, stated that "Commerce among the States ... consists of intercourse and traffic
between their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and property."9'
Four years later in Caminetti v. United
States, the Court ruled that "[t]he transportation of passengers
in interstate commerce . . . is within the regulatory power of
Congress, under the commerce clause .. . and the authority of
Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from
88 Lopez, 541 U.S. at 557 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist,J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618. Although Morrison concluded that violence
against women did not fit into the "interstate activity" category, subsequent rulings based partially or significantly on Morrison have deemed that some seemingly
less significant issues fit the category for Commerce Clause purposes. In Gibbs v.
Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), a split panel ruled that a federal regulation
protecting endangered wolves met the Morrison economic activity test and was
thus subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny. In United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394
(6th Cir. 2000), the court ruled that possession of a weapon while subject to a
domestic violence order impacts interstate commerce.
911See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp.
1149, 1164-65 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
91 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913).
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immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and
is no longer open to question.

'9 2

As transportation methods ad-

vanced into the modern era of automobile and then air travel,
so to did federal regulation into those aspects of travel.93 Eventually, it would apply to airport terminals.94
B.

IMPACT OF DISCRIMINATION ON TRANSPORTATION

In 1960, the Court was faced with a direct question of the effect of discriminatory behavior within transportation facilities
on interstate commerce. The fascinating case of Boynton v. Virginia addressed racial discrimination by owners and managers of
terminal restaurants.9 5 The Court found that these discriminatory practices had an adverse affect on interstate commerce.
Boynton involved a black law student who was traveling by bus
from Washington D.C. to Alabama. During a forty-minute stopover in Richmond, he refused to leave the whites-only section of
a Richmond Trailways Bus Terminal restaurant. He was subsequently convicted and fined $10 on a charge that he
"[u] nlawfully did remain on the premises of the Bus Terminal
Restaurant of Richmond, Inc. after having been forbidden to do
so by the Assistant Manager. '"96 Specifically, the student was
found to have violated a Virginia code which said that "[i]f any
person shall without authority of law go upon or remain upon
the ... premises of another, after having been forbidden to do
so by the owner . . . he shall be deemed guilty of a misde-

meanor."97 Among the student's claims on appeal was a Commerce Clause argument that, as an interstate passenger, he was
due federal protection against discrimination in the terminal
Caminetti. v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917).
See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 383 (1946) (finding that the nature of
travel makes no difference in the power of federal regulation of transportation
and stating that "[t]he recent changes in transportation brought about by the
coming of automobiles [do] not seem of great significance."). See also Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (noting that all varieties of transportation and factors associated with that
transportation can be subject to the Commerce Clause: "The facilities and instrumentalities used to carry on this commerce, such as railroads, truck lines, ships,
rivers, and even highways are also subject to congressional regulation, so far as is
necessary to keep interstate traffic upon fair and equal terms.").
94 See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 992 F. Supp. at 1164.
95 See Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
96 Id. at 455-56 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
97 Id. at 456 (quoting VA. CODE § 18-225 (1958)).
92

93
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restaurant, which was used by the bus carrier to serve interstate
passengers ....

98

The Supreme Court analyzed this portion of the student's
claim by referring to previous rulings regarding discrimination
against blacks in railroad dining cars. In Henderson v. United
States, the Court ruled that discrimination in service to passengers due to their color in railroad dining cars violated the Commerce Clause. 99 In making its decision, the Henderson Court
focused more on discrimination as a whole rather than its impact on interstate commerce: "Where a dining car is available to
passengers holding tickets entitling them to use it, each such
passenger is equally entitled to its facilities in accordance with
reasonable regulations."' 0
The Boynton Court transferred this anti-discrimination theme
into its holding, but more specifically addressed the interstate
commerce ramifications. Instead of a straight Commerce
Clause analysis, the Boynton court opted to explore the Interstate
Commerce Act. Section 216 of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act provides that " [i] t shall be unlawful for any common
carrier ...

engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to make,

give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person in any respect whatsoever; or to
subject any particular person ... to any unjust discrimination or
any unjust . .. prejudice." ''

The Court first ruled that bus terminals fell within the Act's
definition of a "carrier" because the Act was devised to apply to
"interstate transportation facilities and property operated or
controlled by a motor carrier."' 1° 2 Thus, the Court forbade the
terminal restaurant's blatant prejudice by finding that "the terminal and restaurant must provide [their] services without discriminations prohibited by the Act. In the performance of these
services, under such conditions the terminal and restaurant
stand in the place of the bus company in the performance of its
transportation obligations."'0 3
While the Boynton and San Francisco cases both deal with discriminatory practices regarding transportation, the Boynton decision doesn't translate into a favorable finding for the San
s See id.
99 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
'00 See id. at 824.
10149 U.S.C. § 316(d) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10701, 10741 (2002)).
1'2 Boynton, 364 U.S. at 459-60.
103 Id. at 464.
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Francisco Ordinance. Boynton is only indirectly related to the
San Francisco case, mainly because the Court in Boynton didn't
find the Virginia code unconstitutional, only its application.
Boynton does however raise an awareness of the Court's view on
discrimination in interstate commerce.
COMMERCE CLAUSE AND

VI.

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
A.

COMMERCE CLAUSE APPLICATION TO FIGHT DISCRIMINATION

Had the discriminatory practices by the airlines in question in
San Francisco been related to skin-color rather than sexual orientation, the Ordinance would have surely been upheld. This
conclusion is drawn from the Supreme Court's history of approving Commerce Clause legislation geared towards halting racial discrimination.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,' °4 the Court rejected an attack on the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 brought by the owners of an Atlanta hotel
that refused to rent rooms to blacks. Heart of Atlanta, a large
motel in-downtown Atlanta, was appealing a district court order
enjoining the owners "from continuing to violate Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to accept Negroes as lodgers
solely because of their race.""' 5 Among other things, the Act,
which came about due to the strong urgings of Presidents Robert F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, sought to "prevent discrimination

.

.

.

in places of accommodation

and public

106

The Court focused on the "overwhelming evidence
facilities."
of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on
commercial intercourse."' ' Included in that evidence, which
comprised various Senate Committee hearings and reports, was
a letter from the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency
stating that it was his "belief that air commerce is adversely affected by the denial to a substantial segment of the traveling
public of adequate and desegregated public accommodaHeart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).
Id. at 268 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 247. Specifically, Title II, § 201 (a) provides that: "All persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation,
as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of
race, color, religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2001).
107 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 257.
104

105
106
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tions. ''" "

The ultimate conclusion was that "this uncertainty

stemming from racial discrimination had the effect of discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro
community."' 9
Unwilling to adhere to the Act, which would have required
the hotel owners to adjust their policy to accommodate all races,
the owners argued that the operation of the motel was of a
"purely local character."' 0 The Court rejected this claim by reasoning that "'if it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it
does not matter how local the operation which applies the
squeeze. ' "
By granting power to Congress under the Commerce Clause
to apply the Act to a motel that discriminates against blacks, the
Supreme Court appeared to place a stamp of approval on federal acts directed towards ending discriminatory practices. Yet,
San Francisco's Ordinance, which was constructed to deter antigay policies, received no such stamp from the Northern District
of California.
VII.

COMMERCE CLAUSE AND LOCAL INTERESTS
A.

LOCAL INTERESTS PREVAIL REGARDLESS OF

NATIONAL IMPACT

In California, the district court found local interests to be
subordinate to national interests in unfettered interstate commerce. However, in 1989 the Maryland Supreme Court fully
recognized and supported the anti-discriminatory goals of the
City of Baltimore in Board of Trustees of Employees'Retirement System
v. Mayor of Baltimore"2 Maryland's highest court ruled that a city
may have a legitimate and strong public interest in disassociating itself from discriminatory practices. In this instance, a city
ordinance called for divesture of city funds from companies that
had business dealings with South Africa. "[I]t is indisputable
that the Ordinances effectuate legitimate, local public interests
....
They permit the City and its citizens to distance themselves
from the moral taint of coventuring in firms that . . . help to
108 Id. at 253 (quoting S. REP. No. 872, at 12-13 (1963)).
109

I(.

1i

Id. at 258.

111Id. (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460,
464 (1949)).
112 Board ofTrIstees of Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562
A.2d 720, 755 (Md. 1989). A more detailed analysis of the impact of this case can
be found infra Part VIII.D.
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maintain South Africa's system of racial discrimination."' '" The
court then reached a conclusion that San Francisco probably
wishes had been repeated by the Northern District of California
in 1998: "[The Ordinances] express the City's sensitivity to the
deep feeling of its citizenry on this matter of fundamental
' 4
human dignity.""
VIII.

COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITATIONS TO LOCAL
REGULATIONS: ADVERSE IMPACT ON
OUTSIDE STATES

A.

EXTRA-TERRITORAL EFFECT

The Supreme Court has made it clear that it would be imprudent to argue for an ordinance like San Francisco's without fully
considering its potential impact on outside states. One consideration should be whether the ordinance is dealing with business activity that is not occurring anywhere within that state. In
other words, should the Ordinance be upheld when the discriminatory measures it seeks to admonish do not occur anywhere
within San Francisco?
As the Supreme Court made clear in Healy v. Beer Institute,
"the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation
arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into
the jurisdiction of another State."'"' Healy involved a Connecticut beer-price-affirmation statute that required out-of-state beer
shippers to assure that their posted prices for products sold to
Connecticut wholesalers are, as of the time of posting, no more
than the prices for those products in neighboring states.'' 6 In
1984, a brewers' trade association and major producers and importers of beer filed suit against the statute.' '7 The association
claimed that the statute violated the Commerce Clause by regulating out-of-state transactions and unduly burdening interstate
commerce."18
The brewers were concerned that the statute established price
limitations on products to be sold in other states." 19 Once the
113Id.

I"' Id. See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989)
(ruling that local governments have a compelling interest "in assuring that public
dollars . . . do not serve to finance the evil of private prejudice.").
"5

Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989).

if See id. at 326.
117

Id.

118 Id.

at 327-28.

,,
I Id. at 328.
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brewers posted a price in Connecticut, they would be unable to
21
change their prices in the neighboring states.

1

The Supreme Court took heed of the brewers' concerns and
scrutinized every possible impact of the Connecticut statute on
interstate commerce. 12 ' The Court's goal: to determine
whether the statute had the practical effect of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside Connecticut.1 22 In particular,
the Court sought to maintain "the Constitution's special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union
unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce
and with the autonomy of the individual States within their re1 2
spective spheres."

1

In making a determination as to the effects on wholly out-ofstate commerce, the Court's critical inquiry was "whether the
practical effect of the regulation [was] to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State."' 24 The answer was a resounding "yes," mostly because the statute would impact price settings
25
in bordering Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island.'
Despite the statute's purpose of protecting Connecticut citizens
from overpriced beer, the Court ruled in favor of the brewers
because "a statute that directly controls commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent
limits of the enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless
of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by
the legislature." 126
The California District Court closely followed Healy when analyzing the impact of the San Francisco Ordinance. The district
court found that the Ordinance had a similar effect as the Connecticut statute in Healy because "[o] nce a company signs a City
contract, it cannot provide discriminatory benefit packages to its
Id. at 338.
1'2 Id. at 327.
122 Id. at 330.
123 Id. at 335-36 (footnotes omitted).
124 Id. at 336.
125 Each state was impacted differently.
New York was affected because the
brewers' promotional discounts applied in that state. The statute treated such
promotions as a reduction in price. Thus, the New York brewers would be locking in their Connecticut prices at the promotional New York price. Because Connecticut does not permit volume discounts, brewers in Rhode Island would have
their Connecticut prices set at the lowest of their volume-discounted prices. Massachusetts brewers would be burdened by having to predict future prices before
posting their Connecticut price.
121 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
120
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employees anywhere in the United States without facing penalties imposed by the City.'

127

In other words, via the Ordinance,

San Francisco "regulates certain extraterritorial practices of City
contractors."128
Thus, the California district court passed on an opportunity to
curb the discriminatory practice of some ATA members' benefit
packages. One argument can be made that this was necessary to
protect the interests of outside states. The counter argument,
and the result of the Healy decision, is that discriminatory practices can often find a safe haven within the Commerce Clause.
B.

COURT'S PREFERENCE FOR STATE AUTONOMY OVER

LocAL GoALs

More recent Commerce Clause rulings by the Supreme Court,
which stress state autonomy, will make it difficult for anti-discriminatory ordinances like the one in San Francisco to survive
constitutional challenges. As seen in the 1996 case BMW of
ability to
North America v. Gore, any perceived threat to a state's
29
1
extinguished.
be
will
commerce
own
control its
In BMW, the Court had to decide if the Alabama Supreme
Court could include the actions of out of state BMW dealers
when determining punitive damages against an in-state BMW
distributor. ° The Alabama dealer in this case had violated
state law by not revealing to a customer that a car sold to that
buyer had been repainted prior to sale.' 3 ' The dealer was following BMW's national nondisclosure policy, which did not require dealers to reveal repairs that effect less than 3% of the
car. 112 The customer sued BMW for its national nondisclosure
policy. 133 The conduct of the Alabama dealer-not disclosing

a car-was illegal in Alabama, but legal in
every presale repair 1 to
34
several other states.

In finding the $2 million penalty set by the Alabama Supreme
Court excessive, the Supreme Court fell back on the Healy principles. Said the Court:
127 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp.
1149, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
128

Id.

129 BMW
130 Id.

of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).

131 Id.
132

Id.

133
14

Id.
Id. at 571.
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[W]hile we do not doubt that Congress has ample authority to
enact such a policy for the entire Nation, it is clear that no single
State could do so, or even impose its own policy choice on neighboring States ...[O]ne State's power to impose burdens on the
interstate market for automobiles is not only subordinate to the
federal power over interstate commerce, . . . but is also constrained by the need to respect the interests of other States.' 5
The most damaging aspect of this decision with regard to the
San Francisco Ordinance is the Supreme Court's fervent stance
on protecting any form of state commerce from an outside
state's law. "[B]y attempting to alter BMW's nationwide policy,
Alabama would be infringing on the policy choices of other
States ....Alabama does not have the power.., to punish BMW
for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no
impact on Alabama or its residents."' 3 6

C.

AUTONOMY ARGUMENT ADVERSELY IMPACTS ORDINANCE

The BMW ruling provides a model argument for opponents
of the San Francisco Ordinance. That argument would be that
the Ordinance is attempting to alter the national benefits policies of certain airlines. If the State of Alabama couldn't infringe
this on BMW for a policy as insignificant as automobile repairs,
then a major policy affecting company benefits is also
untouchable.
This emphasis on state autonomy ultimately was a major factor in the California court's decision against the Ordinance. In
discussing the extraterritorial reach of the Ordinance, the court
pointed out that "[oince a company signs a [San Francisco]
contract, it cannot provide discriminatory benefit packages to its
employees anywhere in the United States without facing penalties imposed by the city. ' 1 3 7 Regardless of San Francisco's goal
of defending its citizens' right not to deal with companies that
practice discrimination, the court remained staunch on protecting state autonomy: "[T] he City effectively regulates certain extraterritorial practices of city contractors... [T] he Ordinance is
unconstitutional as applied to out-of-State conduct. '13
Obviously, it didn't matter that the out-of-State conduct being protected was discrimination.
135

Id.

116Id.

at 572-73.

1v

Air Transp. Assn of Am., 992 F. Supp. at 1162.

138

Id.
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CITIZEN'S INTERESTS V. STATE AUTONOMY

Despite its insistence on protecting state autonomy, the Supreme Court has not looked favorably on Commerce Clause arguments used to protect discriminatory practices that run
counter to the interests of a state's citizenry. As evidenced in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., a city can take measures to
ensure that its citizens' money is not used to further discrimination. 39 The highest court in Maryland took a similar stance in
Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore v. Mayor
of Baltimore.14
While Croson is known mostly as a landmark case in the equal
protection arena, it also provides the basis for an argument for
protecting a citizenry's interest against supporting companies
that discriminate. In Croson, the Supreme Court shot down a
city plan requiring "prime contractors . . .awarded [city] contracts to subcontract a certain percentage of their profit from
each contract to Minority Business Enterprises" because it violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 4 '
But while reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court did
recognize that a city has the power to protect its citizens from
indirectly supporting entities that discriminate: "It is beyond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has a compelling
interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of pri2

vate prejudice."14

The Maryland Supreme Court used this idea of blocking the
financing of private prejudice in the Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore case. The court was faced
with a Commerce Clause challenge against a pair of city ordinances requiring city employee pension systems to divest their
holdings in companies with business interests in South Africa.
The Trustees contended that the Baltimore ordinances placed
an "impermissible burden on interstate commerce and improperly regulate foreign commerce. '
The court recognized the potential burdens on interstate
commerce that could be brought on by the ordinances, but de139City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 462 (1989).

of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys. of Baltimore v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989).
141See Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
1,12 1d. at 492.
145 Bd. of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 749.
141) Board
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cided that the purpose of these ordinances-fighting discrimination-outweighed any financial consequences. "While we do
not dispute that the ordinances impose some burden ... that
burden is not excessive in relation to the benefits. ' 144 Then, in a

move that should have been made by the Northern District
Court of California, the Maryland Supreme Court firmly defended the city's desire not to support racism. Said the court:
[I] t is indisputable that the Ordinances effectuate legitimate, local public interests. The divestiture provisions respond to the local interest in managing the City's finances and in ensuring that
pension funds are invested in a socially responsible manner.
They permit the City and its citizens to distances themselves from
the moral taint of coventuring in firms that, in the view of many,
help to maintain South Africa's system of racial discrimination .... [T]hey express the City's sensitivity to the deep feeling

of its citizenry on this matter of fundamental human dignity.' 45
The court then applied a balancing test that, if applied to the
San Francisco Ordinance, would appear to favor the Ordinance.
The test pitted local concerns versus the relative burden of these
concerns on interstate commerce. "The Ordinances embody
the City's moral condemnation of racial discrimination. The
use of pension funds ...

is an issue of deep concern ...

to all

citizens of Baltimore who are sensitive to slavery's persistent legacy .... [T]he Ordinances burden on the interstate sale of se-

curities does not outweigh these unique and profound local
concerns." 146
When the Northern District Court of California applied this
balancing test to the San Francisco Ordinance, the scales again
tilted toward protecting local public interest and away from interstate commerce. The California court construed the Maryland Supreme Court's balancing test to mean that such
ordinances fail if the burden they place on interstate commerce
are "excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."' 147 With
regard to the application of the Ordinance to ATA members
within California that use discriminatory benefits practices, the
court determined that the Ordinances were not overly burdensome. "[T]he local interest in dissociating the City from discrimination justifies the minor burden of requiring companies
to modify discriminatory benefit plans, especially because conld. at 755.
I'
145 Id.

I, Id.
147 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 992 F. Supp. at 1164-65.
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tractors can comply with the Ordinance without increasing their
benefit costs.'

48

Ecstatic over this portion of the decision, Tom

Ammiano, a gay supervisor who was a driving force behind the
Ordinance, crowed, "I am as happy as a pig in a poke. The law
was left standing."' 49
But this proved to be a hollow victory for supporters of the
Ordinance. Because the Ordinance was deemed to be impermissibly extraterritorial with regard to the out-of-state activities
of ATA members, it was found to be in violation of the Commerce Clause.15 0 The airlines would only have to extend same5
sex benefits to their in-state businesses.' '
IX.

EXCESSIVE BURDEN DILEMMA
A.

THE EXPENSE ARGUMENT

The key problem was that, despite the obvious legitimacy of
the local interest, the Ordinance would force significant financial burdens on ATA members that wished to contract with the
airport. A high financial burden can cause the scales to tip away
from local public interest. 52 In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the
Supreme Court was faced with a Commerce Clause argument
regarding an Arizona act requiring all cantaloupes grown in the
state and offered for sale to be packed in a manner that met the
approval of a state supervisor.1 5 ' To meet this requirement, the
growing company would need a harvesting factory in Arizona
where a state inspector could do his duties. In this case, the
appellee company circumvented the act by transporting the harvested cantaloupes to their California factory, which
was only
5
1
Arizona.
in
site
growing
the
from
miles
thirty-one
When the official in charge of enforcing the act brought suit,
the grower countered with a Commerce Clause argument that it
would be too expensive for the company to adhere to the act.
The grower claimed that it could only satisfy the act by building
facilities within Arizona. 55 The grower estimated that "the practical effect of the ... order would be to compel the company to
Id.
149 Epstein, supra note 18.
150 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 992 F. Supp. at
148

151
152

1162.

See supra Part VIII.A.
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).

151 See id. at 138.
154 Id. at 139.
155 Id. at 140.
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build packing facilities in . . .Arizona, that would take many
'
months to construct and would cost approximately $200,000."156
The Supreme Court believed that there existed a legitimate
local purpose, but that the interest could not withstand a showing of a disproportionate burden on interstate commerce. "If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes

one of degree. '' 1 57 Here, the degree of the state's interest-an

indirect financial perk gained by enhancing the reputation of
instate growers-was not enough to justify the financial burden
it placed on the grower. Said the Court,
[T]he State's tenuous interest in having the company's cantaloupes identified as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally justify the requirement that the company build and operate
an unneeded $200,000 packing plant ...Even where the State is
pursing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden
58
on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.'

The California court's reliance on the Pike decision frustrated
San Francisco's efforts to battle discrimination. This Commerce
Clause argument, which cites expense as a burden, makes it easy
for those who discriminate to continue their practices without
fear of intrusion by the courts.
X.

GETTING THE ORDINANCE PAST THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. THE LEGITIMATE LocAL PURPOSE TEST

Obviously, the impact of the Ordinance on the citizens of San
Francisco was not enough to sway the Northern District Court of
California. However, one tactic that may have swayed the court
to fully favor the Ordinance would have been application of the
Hughes test.
The notion of giving deference to local interests was advanced
by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma.15 9 The Court

ruled that the test to be applied when faced with a local regulation that discriminates against interstate trade is: (1) the statute
must serve a legitimate local purpose; and (2) the purpose must
be one that cannot be served as well by available non-discrimina60
tory means.
156

Id.

157 Id.
158 Id.

at 145.
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
160 See id.
159Hughes
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The Supreme Court later applied this test in Maine v. Taylor,
when a statute against importing live baitfish faced a Commerce
Clause challenge. 161 The Court ruled that a Maine statute does
not violate the Commerce Clause; the ban "serve [d] legitimate
local purposes" of protecting the state's unique fisheries from
parasites and non-native species that might be included in shipments of live baitfish and it was shown that such purposes "could
not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory
alternatives. "162
The state satisfied the first prong by showing that there were
"substantial uncertainties" regarding the impact of baitfish parasites on Maine's unique wild fish population. 16' The consequences of that exposure were equally uncertain. The second
prong, regarding available nondiscriminatory alternatives, was
met by showing that "testing procedures for baitfish parasites
had not yet been devised."' 64
An application of the Hughes test to the San Francisco Ordinance may have guided the Northern District Court of California in another direction than the one taken. The city would
have no problem satisfying the first prong. Because of its prominent gay population and long tradition of protecting gay rights,
San Francisco clearly has a legitimate and substantial interest in
prohibiting its businesses from contracting with companies that
have discriminatory benefits packages.
Satisfying the second prong would be more problematic. ATA
could argue that the expense required to extend such benefits
to same-sex couples is too burdensome. This is the common
argument of companies with discriminatory benefits packages. 1 5 San Francisco could counter this by explaining that, not
only would equal benefits packages be inexpensive, but would
actually give the airlines a competitive edge in attracting employees.' 66 Also, San Francisco could follow Maine's argument
that, even if it must "make reasonable efforts to avoid restraining the free flow of commerce across its borders .... it is

not required to develop new and unproven means of protection
at an uncertain cost."' 6 7 And just as Maine did not need to deMaine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
Id. at 151.
See id. at 142.
164Id. at 143.
165 See generally Lynd, supra note 28.
166 See Foreman, supra note 38.
167 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 147.
161

162
163
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velop an alternate method, neither must San Francisco be responsible for developing a less restrictive alternative.
B.

MARKETPLACE PARTICIPATION EXCEPTION

The marketplace participation exception is a common, and
often successful, response to Commerce Clause challenges
against local regulations. 'I If a party can prove that it fits under
the market participant doctrine, it is immune from the Commerce Clause claim of being too burdensome on interstate commerce. According to the Supreme Court, if a locality or state "is
acting as a market participant rather than as a market regulator,
the . . . Commerce Clause places no limitations on its activities..'." Furthermore, as explained by the Supreme Court in
Reeves Inc. v. Stake, "state proprietary activities may be, and often
are, burdened with the same restrictions imposed on private
market participants ....

[W]hen acting as proprietors, States

should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce
Clause." '7,

Market participant status is proven by showing that the entity
that promulgated the ordinance or regulation is acting as a
buyer or seller in a market rather than in "its distinctive governmental capacity."' 7'7 This buyer or seller status can be obtained
by a showing that the state spent its own money when entering
into the commercial activity in question. This standard was established in 1983 in White v. Massachusetts Council Construction
Employers, Inc. 172 In White, the mayor of Boston established an
executive order, which required that city-funded construction
contracts be performed by a minimum portion of local residents. 17 The Supreme Court had to decide if this restriction
violated the Commerce Clause. 74 The Court ruled in favor of
the order, stating that it fit the market participation exception
because "[ilnsofar as the city expended only its own funds in
entering into construction contracts for public projects, it was a
161 The Supreme Court allowed the exception in White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) and in Reeves, Inc v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429

(1980).
169 S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984).
170

Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439.

17, New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 275 (1988).
172
173
174

See White, 460 U.S. at 204.
See id.
Id. at 206.
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market participant .... 175 San Francisco spent city funds to

build SFO, thus it satisfies this requirement of the doctrine.
Also, San Francisco is far from the first locality to seek immunity from the Commerce Clause for an ordinance that benefits
its own citizens to the potential detriment of out-of-state individuals outside of California. States have often successfully used
the marketplace participation exception to aid their own people
to the disadvantage of those in outside states. As established by
the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
"[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause
prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its
own citizens .... 176

For example, in Reeves, the Supreme Court ruled that a South
Dakota policy that directed proceeds from a state-owned cement
plant only to state residents was not implicated by the Commerce Clause because the state had market participant immunity.

77

The Court concluded that the Commerce Clause was

never intended to interfere with a state's right to unhindered
participation in the marketplace. Said the Court, "There is no
indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the
States themselves to operate freely in the free market."' 78 And,
just as San Francisco sought the right to pick which companies
they could contract with (i.e., companies that didn't practice discrimination), South Dakota also desired to choose its business
associates. The Court placed South Dakota in the same light as
an individual businessman and granted the same protections,
stating that the market participant doctrine rests in part on
"'the long recognized right of a trader... freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal.' "179
C.

DOES THE ORDINANCE STRETCH OR BREAK MARKET

PARTICIPATION BOUNDARIES?

There are two major pitfalls that need to be avoided for the
Ordinance to prevail via the Market Participation Doctrine.
First, the Ordinance must not affect areas in which San Fran175Id. at 214-15.

176Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
177See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 429.
178 Id. at 437.

179Id. at 438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919)).
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cisco is not a market participant. As set forth by the Supreme
Court in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, "[t] he
State may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation,
or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of
that particular market."'u s So, while the Ordinance is proper as
it pertains to the city in which it is designated to protect, it may
be poisoning itself by impacting the commerce of foreign states.
In Wunnicke, a city in Alaska had conditioned the selling of
Alaskan timber on the basis that the manufacture of the timber
occurs within the state. The Supreme Court ruled that, despite
having reached market participation status, the requirement violated the Commerce Clause. 8 ' The Court set a boundary for an
exception to the doctrine, stating that "the limit of the market
participant doctrine must be that it allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market
in which it is a participant,
'l 2
but allows it to go no further."'

When San Francisco argued for the marketplace participant
exception, the Northern District of California analyzed whether
the Ordinance burdened markets in which San Francisco was
not a participant. This was done by applying a version of the
Wunnicke test, which the court set out as "whether, by implementing the Ordinance, the City inappropriately reaches beyond the sphere of economic activity in which it is participating
in an attempt to regulate commerce beyond its borders."'8 3
Based on a footnote from the Hughes decision, the court narrowed the realm of who may be legally impacted within this
"sphere of economic activity" to those "working for the city.' 184
This seemingly insignificant footnote in Hughes was deadly
when applied to the Ordinance. The Northern District Court of
California ruled that the Ordinance impermissibly regulated
out-of-state commerce. Because the Ordinance requires contractors with SFO to guarantee they will not use discriminatory
benefits packages in any of their businesses elsewhere in the
country, the court ruled that "the Ordinance reaches too far to
be shielded by the market participant exception ... [T] his class
of economic activity encompasses much more than that in
which the City is a major participant . . . and the individuals
180 S.-Cent. Timber Dev. Inc., v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984).
181 Id. at 84.

Id. at 97.
Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp.
1149, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
184 Id.
182

183
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affected by the Ordinance could hardly be described, even informally, as 'working for the city.' "185
Also, because the Ordinance would seemingly punish contractors for their out-of-California activities, it was deemed inappropriate.1 6 The penalties set out by the Ordinance-two-year ban
from working with the city and forfeiture of money owed by the
city-inadvertently serve a regulatory purpose. "The Ordinance, therefore, has a 'substantial regulatory effect 8outside
7
[the] particular market' in which the. city participates."'
But the Ordinance could have found some salvation under
Wunnicke if the city could show that the Ordinance could be altered to fit within the market participant doctrine. In his fiery
dissent to the majority ruling in Wunnicke, Justice Rehnquist argued that the State of Alaska could have reached its desired result by altering its law to clearly fall within the doctrine."8 8
Therefore, the city would have to show that it could restructure
the doctrine in such a manner as to serve its anti-discriminatory
goals without forcing contractors to changing their discriminatory practices throughout the United States.
Obviously, such a modification would be conceptually impossible. Because ATA members are based throughout the country,
there is no practical method by which the Ordinance could be
re-written to affect only instate activities. This fact was not lost
on the Northern District of California: "Rehnquist's criticisms
...

do not apply here. There is no way that the City could mod-

ify this portion of the Ordinance so that it would meet the requirements of the marketplace participant doctrine ....

[T]he

imposition of national nondiscrimination guarantees pursuant
to the Ordinance is not shielded by the marketplace participant
exception. '' 119
D.

A

COMMERCE CLAUSE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF

THE ORDINANCE

Obviously, the Hughes test and Market Participant Doctrine
are difficult arguments filled with landmines at each turn. Per-

haps a safer approach for clearing local regulations like the Ordinance would be a policy-based Commerce Clause argument.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187

Id.

188

S.-Cent. Timber Dev., 467 U.S. at 101-03 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).

189 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 992 F. Supp. at 1163.
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Since the courts disfavor legislation that unduly burdens interstate commerce, San Francisco could argue that the Ordinance
is necessary to ease the burden that discrimination against
homosexuals places on interstate commerce.
This argument would be based on the idea that happier domestic partners are more productive in the marketplace, and
thus less likely to be a drain on the local or national economies.
Extending domestic partner benefits promotes the "economic
stability of the partners individually and of the families created
by the partners. The larger society will benefit from these improvements... For example, partners in stable relationships will
be more productive, more involved in their community, and less
likely to be dependent on social programs.""' Therefore, a lack
of local ordinances that mandate domestic partner benefits
places a burden on any interstate commerce that involves participants of same sex marriages.
Considering the Supreme Court's inconsistent application of
the Commerce Clause to local regulations-especially those ordinances that strive to erase moral evils such as discriminationthis argument may just work.
XI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's inconsistent application of the Commerce Clause leaves little hope for any locale that seeks to
cleanse itself of discrimination. Every time a city enacts legislation to realize this goal, an opposing party can claim it is unconstitutional under a variety of Commerce Clause arguments.
Whether it is a "burden on interstate commerce" argument, or
one of "extraterritoriality," the local legislation will face constant
lethal challenges that it has very little chance of surviving.
Unfortunately, those that strive to fight discrimination
through city ordinances are left with little or no hope for victory. As San Francisco learned, the most that can be gained by
establishing an anti-discrimination ordinance is a partial victory.
The Commerce Clause makes complete victory impossible.
190Philip Horne, ChallengingPublic- and Private-SectorBenefit Schemes Which Discriminate Against Unmarried Opposite-Sex and Same-Sex Partners,4 LAW & SEXUALITY
34, 38 (1994).

